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Cuba Confrontation Cited

Joint Chiefs See ABM As a Crisis Deterrent

By George C. Wilson Washington Post Staff Writer

The United States must Staff argue in a still secret build a missile defense to position paper. keep the kind of strategic This view conflicts with

edge that won the Cuban misthat of Defense Secretary sile crisis, the Joint Chiefs of Robert S. McNamara, who favors foregoing an ABM (anti-ballistic - missile) system and relying on offensive missiles for "deterrence"—the strategy of making nuclear var so unthinkable that it will 10t occur.

"Deterrence is a combinaion of forces in being and tate of mind," the Chiefs tate. "Should the Soviets come o believe that their ballistic nissile defense, coupled with ı nuclear attack on the United States, would limit damage to he Soviet Union to a level aceptable to them — whatever hat level is-our forces would '. 10 longer deter, and the first principle of our security pol-cy is gone."

The Chiefs agree with Mc-Namara that the ability to destroy an attacker with offensive missiles is basic to deterrence. But they argue that the opposite is also true-that deterrence decreases in proportion to how much the enemy figures it could blunt a retaliatory atack. The blunting ABM system therefore cannot be separated out in figuring deterrent value, they maintain.

U.S. nuclear superiority has been so overwhelming up to

See CHIEFS, A6, Col. 1